In this paper, we present two extensions of the strand space method to model Kerberos V. First, we include time and timestamps to model security protocols with timestamps: we relate a key to a crack time and combine it with timestamps in order to define a notion of recency. Therefore, we can check replay attacks in this new framework. Second, we extend the classic strand space theory to model protocol mixture. The main idea is to introduce a new relation a to model the causal relation between one primary protocol session and one of its following secondary protocol session. Accordingly, we also extend the definition of unsolicited authentication test.
Introduction
The strand space model [1] is a formal approach to reasoning about security protocols. For a legitimate regular participant, a strand s represents a sequence of messages that the participant would receive or send as part of a run as his/her role of the protocol. A typical message has the form of { } K h denoting the encryption of h using key K . An element of the set of messages is called a term. A term ' t is a subterm of t is written as t t ' ⊏ . Usually, we call a strand element node. Nodes can be either positive, representing the transmission of a term, or negative, representing the reception of a term. For the penetrator, the strand represents atomic deductions. More complex deductions can be formed by connecting several penetrator strands. Hence, a strand space is simply a set of strands with a trace mapping. Two kinds of causal relation (arrow), → and ⇒ , are introduced to impose a graphic structure on the nodes of the space. The relation is defined to be the reflexive and transitive closure of these two arrows, modelling the causal order of the events in the protocol execution. The formal analysis based on strand spaces can be carried on the notion of bundles. A bundle is a causally well-founded set of nodes and the two arrows, which sufficiently formalizes a session of a protocol. In a bundle, it must be ensured that a node is included only if all nodes that proceed it are already included. For the strand corresponding to a principal in a given protocol run, we construct all possible bundles containing nodes of the strand. In fact, this set of bundles encodes all possible interactions of the environment with that principal in the run. Normally, reasoning about the protocol takes place on this set of bundles. However, the original strand space model has its semantical limitations to analyze the real-world protocols such as Kerbeoros protocols. First, it does not include timestamps as formalized message components, and therefore can not model security protocols with timestamps. In fact, the strand space model [1] as given by Thayer Fábrega, Herzog, and Guttman is only benchmarked on nonce-based protocols such as the NeedhamSchroeder protocol and the Otway-Rees protocol. But many modern protocols use timestamps to prevent replay attacks, so this deficiency of the strand space theory makes it difficult to analyze these protocols. Second, it does not address issues of the protocol dependency when several protocols are mixed together. Many real-world protocols are divided into causally related multiple phases (or subprotocols), such as the Kerberos and Neuman-Stubblebine protocols. One phase may be used to retrieve a ticket from a key distribution center, while a second phase is used to present the ticket to a securityaware server. To make matters more complex, many protocols such as Kerbeors use timestamps to guarantee the recency of these tickets, that is, such tickets are only valid for an interval, and multiple sub-protocol sessions can start in parallel by the same agent using the same ticket if the ticket does not expire. Little work has been done to formalize the causal relation between protocols in a protocol mixture environment.
The aim of this paper is twofold. The first aim is to extend the strand space theory to cover the aforementioned two semantical features. Briefly, we include time and timestamps to model security protocols with timestamps: we relate a key to a crack time and combine it with timestamps in order to define a notion of recency. Therefore, we can check replay attacks in this new framework. We also extend the classic strand space theory to model protocol mixture: a new relation a is introduced to model the causal relation between one primary protocol session and one of its following secondary protocol session. Despite the extensions, we hope that the extended theory still maintains the simple and powerful mechanism to reason about protocols. The second aim is practical. We hope to apply the extended theory to the analysis of some real-world protocols. Here we select Kerberos V as our case study. Kerberos V is appropriate because it covers both timestamps and protocol mixture semantical features.
Motivations

A Short Introduction to Kerberos V
The first version of Kerberos protocol was developed in the mid eighties as part of project Athena at MIT [2] . Over twenty years, different versions of Kerberos protocols have evolved. Kerberos V (Figure 1 and Figure 2 ) is the latest version released by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [4] . It is a password-based system for authentication and authorization over local area networks. It is designed with the following aims: once a client authenticates himself to a network machine, the process of obtaining authorization to access another network service should be completely transparent to him. Namely, the client only needs enter his password once during the authentication phase. In order to access some network service, the client needs to communicate with two trusted servers Kas and Tgs . Kas is an authentication server (or the key distribution center) and it provides keys for communication between clients and ticket granting servers. Tgs is a ticket granting server and it provides keys for communication between clients and application servers. The full protocol has three phases each consisting of two messages between the client and one of the servers in turn. Messages 2 and 4 are different from those in Kerberos IV [2, 4] in that nested encryption has been cancelled. Later we will show that this change does not affect goals of the protocol. rity protocols with timestamps. Timestamps are mainly used to avoid replay attacks in the literature of security protocols. Usually such attacks occur in protocols that involve a message encrypted by a session key, and the session key itself is sent as a part of a message which is encrypted by a long-term key. Although penetrators can never obtain a long-term key K if K is not sent as a part of a message, it is usually assumed that m will be obtained from { } K m via cryptanalysis by a penetrator after some time t , especially if a session key SK is a component of m , then it will be compromised after the time t . Here, we say that the time t is the crack time of K , and every key will be related to a crack time.
Although the penetrator cannot obtain m from { } K m during a protocol session provided that { } K m did not occur in any old session and K 's crack time is longer than the time of a session allowed, he still may replay stale messages and use the old compromised session keys to launch attacks if some message of the protocol does not contain necessary information to indicate its recency.
For example, in the Needham-Schroeder symmetric key protocols (see Figure 3) , when B receives the third
, although B can infer that it was generated by S , he is not certain of its recency because no such information is available. Perhaps { } A K t by S to mark the time of issue, and will be compared with the current time by the receiver B to check whether the ticket is recent. In this paper, we will assume that all agents are synchronized via a global clock, so an agent knows the time when receiving or sending a message. In this paper, we extend the strand space model with such features. A crack time is attached to every key. The crack-time of a key K is the time needed by a penetrator to break an encrypted message { } K m . 1 We model a timestamp in the same way as atomic messages. A regular agent can attach a timestamp in a message to indicate when it sends the message, and check whether a received message encrypted by a key K is recent by comparing the timestamp in the message with the current time and the crack time of K . Once a message { } K m is no longer recent, a penetrator can break the message to obtain m .
Protocol Mixture
Another important feature of Kerberos, which is difficult to model in strand space, is protocol mixture. Kerberos protocol comprises three protocol phases: authentication, authorization, and service protocol phases. Once a client has passed an authentication phase and obtained an authentication ticket, then he can use the ticket to start multiple sessions of the authorization protocol phases in parallel to obtain different service tickets to access the services he needs provided that the authentication ticket does not expire. Similarly, once the client has gone through a session of the authorization phase, then he can use the service ticket obtained to access the service server for many times provided that the service ticket does not expire. Usually we refer to a protocol as one primary protocol, and the protocol following it as a secondary protocol. We note that other researchers have discussed the problem of protocols mixture [7, 8] , but they emphasized more on independency between two protocols. Namely, if they have disjoint encryption, then the first protocol is independent of the second. By this they mean that if the first protocol can achieve a security goal (either an authentication goal or a secrecy goal) when executed in isolation, then it still achieves the same security goal when executed in combination with the second protocol. In their theory, one primary and one secondary strands are rather independent of each other.
However, in Kerberos protocols, a secondary strand cannot be independent of its primary strand, and the events of a secondary strand has temporal relation with the events of the primary strand. For example, assuming that a client A runs a session T when the ticket is created, and checks how much time has elapsed until now. This side condition cannot be expressed without the semantical specification of s , because in the intended case the ticket is a term encrypted with Tgs 's long-term key, which is unintelligible to A , A cannot know a T from the ticket. Then A can only know the time a T from the previous authentication phase s . Therefore, we need to formalize the facts that ' s follows s , and A holds all the knowledge of s when he runs ' s , and there should be causal relation between events in s and those in ' s . Such semantical features are not covered in [7, 8] .
In order to model the aforementioned causal relation between a primary strand and its following secondary strands, we introduce a new relation a between strands. s . E.g., when a client starts an authorization session, he uses an authentication ticket which is obtained in the preceding authentication session, and he knows the time when the ticket is created. So a causal relation should be imposed on two events which occur in a primary strand and its subsequent secondary strand. Figure 4 illustrates a possible protocol execution of Kerberos V using the relation . a A client runs an instance in authentication phase, which is represented by the strand 1 i . Following the primary protocol instance, the same client may run three authorisation subprotocol instances in parallel, which are showed in the strands 21 i , , 22 i and 23 i respectively. 21 Tr is a subtree which is a collection of client strands in the service phase. This means that the client use the same authTicket to obtain two different server tickets for accessing servers 1 B and . i and 1 i are independent, therefore the knowledge inherence relation between them can not be imposed.
We extend the relation ⇒ in the strand space model in the way that 1 n is an immediate causal predecessor of 2 n on the same strand s or that 1 n is the last event in a primary strand s and 2 n is the first event in the subsequent secondary strand ' s .
Structure of the Paper. In Section 3, we present the theory of the strand space method with our two extensions. We devote Section 5 to a new definition of unsolicited authentication test. We discuss related work and conclude the paper in Section 6.
Preliminaries
Messages and Actions
The set of messages is defined as the following BNF notation:
where A is an element from a set of agents, n from a set of nonces, K from a set of keys, and t from a set of times. Here we assume that Time is the set of all natural numbers. . Both are the possible actions that participants and a penetrator can take. We represent the set of finite sequences of actions by (Time, ±, Message)*.
Strands and Strand Spaces
A strand space Σ is a set of strands with a trace mapping 
Penetrator Strands
The symbol Bad is defined to denote the set of all the penetrators, and if an agent is not in Bad, then it is regular. There is a set of keys that are known initially to all the penetrators, denoted as P K . P K usually contains all the public keys, all the private keys of all the penetrators, and all the symmetric keys initially shared between all the penetrators and principals playing by the protocol rules. It can also contain some keys to model known-key attacks. In this paper, we only need the fact that if an agent is not a penetrator then his shared key cannot be penetrated, which is formalized as follows.
. In the classic strand space theory, a penetrator can intercept messages, generate messages that are computable from its initial knowledge and the messages it intercepts. These actions are modelled by a set of penetrator strands, and they represent atomic deductions. More complex deduction actions can be formed by connecting several penetrator strands. In our extension, we assume that penetrators share their initial knowledge and can cooperate each other by composing their strands. Besides the behaviors inherited from classic strand space theory, a penetrator has the ability to crack an encrypted message once the message is no longer recent (see 
Bundles
The formal analysis based on strand spaces is carried on the notion of bundles, which represents the protocol execution under some configuration. A bundle is a causally well-founded graph, which sufficiently formalizes a session of a protocol. We have formalized the above extended strand space theory in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [9] . See [10] for details.
Penetrator's Knowledge Closure Property
In this section, we will describe a useful property on penetrator strands. This property specifies what knowledge can be obtained from some special message set. First we need to define a key is regular w.r.t. a node m in a bundle. This definition is about K 's secrecy w.r.t. a node m in a bundle B , which means that K cannot be penetrated before m in the bundle. In most of the cases, we only consider security properties for a protocol in a given bundle, so it is natural for us to just consider whether a key can potentially be penetrated in this bundle. Besides, we also need consider temporal restriction ) ( ) ( m time n time ≤ because we discuss K 's secrecy a timed framework. for some k and , h t can not be cracked before m because the duration between m and n is less than k 's crack time, and this is guaranteed by (2) . Recall that ) (n time is the first time when a occurs because a uniquely originates at . n Now we need introduce a function synth on a message set H , which captures the "building up" aspect of penetrator's ability [4, 11] .
Definition 4 A key K is regular w.r.t. a node m in
( ) H synth is defined to be the least set that includes H , agents, timestamps and is closed under pairing, and encryption.
Definition 7 Consider a message set , H ) (H synth is a message set which is defined inductively as follows:
). (H synth h ∈ In the context of this paper, we usually assume that a is an unguessable atomic message such as a nonce, which is uniquely originated from a regular strand and encrypted in a message. Let }, after the receiving actions. 2) Lemma 5 provides a key technique to prove the authentication guarantee that m is regular. Intuitively, condition (1) of suite requires the secrecy of the inverse key 1 − k for any key k which is used to encrypt any message in M containing a ; condition (2) of operator suite is a recency restriction that these encrypted messages containing a can not be cracked until . m Therefore this lemma provides a means of using secrecy and recency restriction to prove authentication guarantee. We will see this result is very useful for us to check whether a strand is regular in the next sections.
Note that the two lemmas relates the algebraic operator synth in trace theory [4, 11] with penetrator's strand ability to deduce knowledge, which is the most important one which differs our work from the classical strand space theory. Such closure properties are not available in the classical strand space theory because message algebra operators such as synth are not formalized.
Unsolicited Tests
In [12] 
, which contradicts with the minimality of ' m . The proof totally depends on the well-founded induction principle on bundles, and we have formalized the proof of this lemma in Isabelle/HOL in our inductive strand space model, and the proof scripts are available at [10] . In fact, lemma 6 provides a useful proof method to reason about authentication properties basing on secrecy properties. Note that the premise that n is an unsolicited test for { } K h requires that K is regular w.r.t. n in B , which is an assumption on the secrecy of K . And the conclusion is an authentication guarantee of the existence of a regular node m . Besides, compared with the original version of unsolicited test, our result also has two extensions that n m B and m is minimal (i.e.,
. We find that the extended version of unsolicited authentication test is quite useful in many cases, especially in the verification of authentication properties of symmetric key based protocols. In [13] , we have used a version of unsolicited authentication test in the classical strand space theory to give new proofs of authentication properties of the Otway-Rees protocol. In this work, we have successfully applied unsolicited authentication test to our study of the Kerberos V protocol in the next paper.
Conclusions and related Work
This work is an extension of [14] . We have added two new semantical features in our new framework: timestamp and protocol mixture. In essence, our treatment of timestamps is to add a global clock to the underlying execution model, and to extend every action by a temporal annotation. This allows us to align the timestamps sent in the protocol messages with the actual occurrence times of the corresponding actions. Although it is quite straightforward, it gives a powerful mechanism to reason about recency of a message. For protocol mixture, we admit a realistic assumption that a regular agent can start multiple parallel secondary sessions once he has finished a primary protocol session, and he holds all the information of the primary protocol session when he begins a secondary protocol session. So we introduce a causal relation a between strands to model the protocol dependency. The above two semantical features are seldom discussed in previous works of strand space literature.
Despite the aforementioned extensions in semantics, the definition of a bundle, which is the cornerstone of the strand space theory, remains unchanged. So the induction principle on the well-foundedness of a bundle is still effective in our model. Based on this principle, we have proved an extended result of the unsolicited authentication test.
In the literature, most of the existing approaches for protocol analysis have not concentrated on timestamps and replay attacks. These include the CSP modelchecking approach [15] , the rank functions [16] , and the Multi-Set Rewriting formalism (MSR) [17] . Paulson and Bella's inductive method [4, 11] is one exception. They not only have extended their method to model replay attacks, but also have succeeded in applying their method to the Yahalom protocol and the Kerberos IV protocol. Recently, Bozga et al. [18] proposed an approach based on timed automata, symbolic verification techniques and temporal logic to analyze security protocols with timestamps. But they haven't applied their approach to any real-world security protocols.
For protocol mixture, there have been a few works to reason rigorously about protocol interactions. For instance, Meadows studied the Internet Key Exchange protocol, emphasizing the potential interactions among its specific sub-protocols [19] . The analysis work was conducted in the NRL protocol analyzer. Recently, Cremers discussed the feasibility of multi-protocol attacks, and his work is done in the operational semantical framework which considers a so-called type flaw attacks [20] . All these works, including [7] , focus on protocol interactions by message exchanging. Instead, our work emphasizes on the dependency between a primary protocol session and a secondary protocol session. Here we assume that when a regular agent starts a secondary protocol session, he should be aware that he has finished a corresponding primary protocol session, and he maintains all the information obtained in the primary protocol session, such as tickets and the creation time of the tickets. These modelling assumptions fit well with the real-world environments where the Kerberos protocols run.
